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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Timothy Livingston pled guilty to identity theft in 2012 and to possessing a controlled
substance in 2015. He received consecutive, suspended sentences and given probation in each
case. In 2016, Mr. Livingston violated probation, and at the disposition hearing, he asked for
continued probation in both cases, and alternatively, asked the court to consider reducing his
sentences. The district court revoked Mr. Livingston’s probation in both cases, reduced the
original sentence in the 2015 possession case, and imposed a combined, unified term of seven
years, with four years fixed. Mr. Livingston timely filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter,
Rule 35) motion in each case, and the district court denied them both.
On appeal, Mr. Livingston contends that the district court abused its discretion when it
denied his Rule 35 motions, in light of the additional information he presented. He further
asserts that Rule 35’s prohibition against successive motions, as correctly interpreted, did not
preclude him from filing those motions, and therefore did not deprive the district court of
jurisdiction to hear them. He respectfully submits that, to the extent the Court of Appeals
decision in State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430, 438 (Ct. App. 2011), may dictate a different
conclusion, the Court’s interpretation of Rule 35 was incorrect and should be clarified or else
overruled.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Livingston battled drug abuse and mental health disorders for decades. (Presentence
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.13, 29.)

His drug problems lead to a strained

relationship with his mother, and caused him to have little involvement with any of his four
grown children or their families. (PSI, pp.56-64.) In 2012, he pled guilty to misappropriating
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personal identifying information (identify theft) after he admitted opening a credit card account
in his mother’s name, without her permission. (R., pp.91, 95-101; PSI, p.3.)1 He received a
suspended sentence of five years, with three years fixed, and was placed on probation.
(R., pp.98-99.) Mr. Livingston struggled while on probation, largely as the result of his drug
abuse; he had several probation violations and spent time on a rider, but was placed back on
probation in May of 2015. (R., pp.224, 248-249, 254, 261-266.)
In 2015, Mr. Livingston pled guilty to a new felony charge for possessing a controlled
substance; the district court imposed a five-year term, with one-year fixed, to run consecutive to
the sentence in the 2012 identify theft case. (R., pp.271-73, 277-280, 568-569.) In September of
2015, the court placed Mr. Livingston back on probation, this time, with the added condition, in
both cases, that he complete drug court. (R., pp.313, 340, 569)
Then, in 2016, Mr. Livingston admitted violating probation in both cases, in that he had
been dismissed from drug court and had committed a petit theft; he had not, however, used drugs
again or relapsed into drug abuse. (Tr. Vol. 1, p.9, L.20, p.10, Ls.7-14.)2 At his disposition
hearing, Mr. Livingston asked the court to continue his probation in both cases; or, alternatively,
if the court were to revoke probation, to consider restructuring the original sentences, and to
consider confinement at the local jail, with work release. (Tr. Vol. 1, p.28, L.23 – p.29, L.4,
p.34, Ls.7-13.) In support of his position, he introduced six letters of reference. (Tr. Vol. 1,
p.25, Ls.16-14; PSI, pp.55-66.)

1

Citations to the Presentence Investigation Report and attached materials will use the
designation “PSI” and will include the page numbers associated with the 66-page electronic file
containing those documents.
2
There are two transcripts in the appellate record. The first, cited as Vol. 1, contains the hearing
on probation violation, and the hearing on disposition. The second, cited as Vol. 2, contains the
September 6, 2016 hearing on the Rule 35 motions.
2

At the conclusion of the disposition hearing, the district court revoked probation and
reduced the originally-imposed sentence in the 2015 case, from a consecutive five-year term,
with one year fixed, to a consecutive two-year term, with one year fixed; the court sentenced
Mr. Livingston to prison for a combined term of seven years, with four years fixed. (Tr. Vol. 1,
p.45, Ls.1-4.) The orders revoking probation and executing the sentences were filed on June 28,
2016. (R., pp.412, 655.)
On July 12, 2016, Mr. Livingston filed a Rule 35 motion in each case. (R., pp.661-612;
Aug. R., pp.1-2.)3 At the consolidated hearing granted by the court, Mr. Livingston asked the
court, inter alia, to restructure his sentences, so that the terms would run concurrently, instead of
consecutively. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.23, Ls.14-29.) In support of his motions, he presented testimony
from two witnesses: Mary San Roman – a certified drug counselor and the manager of the
Magic Valley Fellowship Hall – who detailed Mr. Livingston’s persistence as he worked to
maintain sobriety and complete the recovery program (Tr. Vol. 2, p.6, L.22 – p.8, p.23, L.19);
and Nancy Livingston – Mr. Livingston’s mother and the victim in the 2012 identity theft case –
who described her son’s significant transformation over the course of the drug court program
(Tr. Vol. 2, p.14, L.12 –p.17, L.2).
Additionally, Mr. Livingston personally addressed the court, emphasizing the fact he had
kept the promise he’d made to the court, in September of 2015, to stay away from drugs and to
remain clean and sober. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.20, L.24 – p.22, L.15.) He also thanked the court for the
opportunity to change his life, and, consequently, to improve the lives of his family members.
(Tr., Vol. 2, p.22, Ls.9-15.)

3

A copy of the written Rule 35 motion that was filed in the 2012 case is being added to the
record, via appellant’s Motion to Augment the Record, filed contemporaneously with this
Appellant’s Brief.
3

The district court entered its order in both cases on September 14, 2016, denying
Mr. Livingston’s Rule 35 motions. (R., pp.432-437, 676-681.) Mr. Livingston timely filed
notices of appeal from those orders on October 24, 2016. (R., pp.452-455, 687-690.) This Court
then consolidated the appeals. (R., p.464.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court have jurisdiction to hear Mr. Livingston’s Rule 35 motions, thereby
authorizing this Court to consider his timely appeals from the orders that denied those
motions?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Livingston’s Rule 35 motions,
in light of the additional information he presented?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Had Jurisdiction To Hear Mr. Livingston’s Rule 35 Motions, And This Court
Therefore Has Authority To Consider His Appeals From The Orders That Denied Those Motions

A.

Introduction
Although it ruled on Mr. Livingston’s Rule 35 motions, the district court suggested that

those motions might have been successive motions prohibited by Rule 35’s one-motion
limitation, because defense counsel, at the dispositional hearing, had asked the court to consider
reducing his sentences if it did not continue probation. (R., pp.336, 680.) Consequently, on
appeal Mr. Livingston anticipates an argument by the State that the Rule 35 motions he filed on
July 12, 2016, after the court revoked probation, were barred as successive motions depriving the
district court of jurisdiction to hear them, and preventing this Court from considering his appeals.
That argument, if made, should be rejected.
Mr. Livingston recognizes that Rule 35 explicitly limits a defendant to filing one motion
for a reduction of sentence, see I.C.R. 35(b), and, that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to hear any
subsequently-filed motion. State v. Bottens, 137 Idaho 730, 733 (Ct. App. 2002). He asserts,
however, that his pre-revocation request for sentencing leniency at the disposition hearing,
including his request for reduction of his sentences, was not a motion made pursuant to Rule 35,
and therefore not a request that is subject to Rule 35’s one-motion limitation. He contends,
therefore, that his request did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to hear the motions he
later filed in each case, after revocation.
Additionally and alternatively, he argues that the Court of Appeals’ Opinion in State v.
Hurst, which held that Rule 35’s successive motion limitation applies to an oral request at a rider
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review hearing, see 151 Idaho 430, 438 (Ct. App. 2011), does not apply to his requests for
leniency at his disposition hearing. He further submits, respectfully, that to the extent the
Court’s holding in Hurst may dictate a different result, that holding was incorrect and should be
clarified, or else overruled.
B.

Standard Of Review
The question of the district court’s jurisdiction to hear and rule upon a defendant’s

Criminal Rule 35(b) motion for a reduction of sentence is one that this Court may consider for
the first time on appeal, and is subject to free review by this Court. See State v. Bottens, 137
Idaho 730, 731 (Ct. App. 2002).
C.

Rule 35’s One-Motion Limitation Does Not Apply To Mr. Livingston’s Pre-Revocation
Request For Leniency, Made At The Disposition Hearing
At the disposition hearing, and prior to revocation, Mr. Livingston’s counsel made a

presentation concerning the options available to the court, and he argued for leniency as the
appropriate disposition in his case. Specifically, he asked the court for continued probation; or,
alternatively, should probation be revoked, for the court to consider reducing his previouslysuspended sentences. (Tr. Vol. 1, p.28, L.23 – p.29, L.4.)4
Mr. Livingston submits that his request for leniency at the disposition hearing was not a
motion subject to Rule 35’s one-motion limitation. He contends that, to the extent the Court of
Appeals in State v. Hurst applied Rule 35’s limitation to a leniency request made at a rider
review hearing, that holding does not apply, and should not be extended, to this case. Finally, to

4

Defense counsels remarks are as follows: “If [revocation] were to happen, we would ask Your
Honor to consider restructuring the sentences in those cases so that perhaps on this type of a
probation violation he would be sent away for four years, which I think would be perhaps a little
too long under these circumstances.” (Tr., p.28, L.23 – p.29, L.4.)
7

the extent the decision in Hurst is deemed to control in this case, Hurst was incorrect and should
be revisited and clarified, or else overruled.
1.

Mr. Livingston’s Pre-Revocation Request For A Leniency His Disposition
Hearing Was Not A Motion For Reduction Of Sentence Under Rule 35

Mr. Livingston’s request for leniency at his probation violation disposition hearing, made
prior to revocation, was not a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35. At a disposition
hearing, the trial court considers whether to revoke or continue probation, and, if probation is to
be revoked, whether to order the suspended sentence executed or, whether to reduce the
sentence. I.C. 19-2603(2), 20-222; I.C.R. 35(b); State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27 (Ct. App.
2009). Thus, once a court decides to revoke probation, the issue becomes the appropriate
sentence to be executed. See State v. Clontz, 156 Idaho 787, 792 (Ct. App. 2014). The court
thus determines a new sentence, taking into account events before and after the original
judgment. See Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. As discussed below, Mr. Livingston had the right to
be heard prior to revocation, and prior to the court deciding his new sentence, and his request for
leniency therefore does not implicate Rule 35’s limitation on the filing of successive motions.
2.

Mr. Livingston Had A Constitutional Right To Be Heard At The Disposition
Hearing, And That Right Cannot Be Restricted By Rule 35

Mr. Livingston held a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in continuing his
probation, and he was entitled to due process throughout the probation revocation proceedings,
which included the right to a hearing before the disposition of his case. State v. Rose, 144 Idaho
762, 766 (2007); State v. Kelsey, 115 Idaho 311, 314 (1988). As discussed above, the issues to
be decided by the trial court at a disposition hearing include not only whether to continue or
revoke probation, but also the appropriate sentence to execute. See State v. Clontz, 156 Idaho
787, 792 (Ct. App. 2014). Mr. Livingston had a due process right to be heard on all of these
8

matters, including the reduction of his original sentences, and Rule 35’s limitation, therefore,
cannot be applied to restrict that right.
3.

The Court Of Appeals’ Decision In Hurst Does Not Control In This Case

In State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430 (Ct. App. 2011), the Idaho Court of Appeals considered
a similar circumstance, but at a rider review hearing. There, defense counsel had asked the trial
court “to consider exercising [its] abilities under Rule 35” and to “consider dramatically cutting
down on [the] fixed time.” Id., at 438. Noting that Idaho’s appellate courts had never addressed
the interpretation and application of Rule 35’s successive motion limitation to this circumstance,
the Court of Appeals decided that counsel’s oral request at the hearing constituted the filing of a
motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35, so as to preclude the filing of any subsequent
motion for reduction of sentence. Id.
Unlike Mr. Livingston’s case, however, Hurst dealt with a rider review hearing, not a
disposition hearing. The defendant in Hurst faced relinquishment and had no constitutionallyprotected liberty interest at stake, and consequently no due process right to be heard prior to
relinquishment. See State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138 (2001). By contrast, as discussed above,
Mr. Livingston had protected liberty interest in continuing his probation, and he had a
constitutional right to be heard regarding disposition. Thus, while the holding in Hurst might be
applicable to rider review hearings, Hurst does not apply, and cannot be extended, to restrict
Mr. Livingston’s constitutionally-protected rights at his disposition hearing.

9

4.

Hurst Improperly Restricts Counsel’s Ability To Advise The Trial Court
Regarding The Appropriate Disposition In A Probation Violation
Disposition Proceeding

The decision in Hurst creates an unwarranted chilling effect on defense counsel’s ability
to advise the trial court of its legal options and thwarts counsel’s ability to advocate for an
appropriate disposition in a defendant’s case. As the Court of Appeals recognized in its more
recent decision in State v. Clontz, 156 Idaho 787, 792 (Ct. App. 2014), “Hurst may have the
consequence of effectively precluding a defendant from frank discussion at the … revocation
hearing regarding reduction of sentence.” Clontz, at 792. Thus, the Court of Appeals has since
realized that, because of the holding in Hurst, “a defendant may be limited in his ability to take
up the issue of reduction of sentence at the time of … revocation, because doing so may impair
the ability to file an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion.” Id., at 791.
Likewise, under the rationale of Hurst, a defendant who has already filed a Rule 35
motion for reduction would be precluded, at any subsequent disposition hearing, from discussing
or even mentioning that the court still has inherent authority and the legal option to reduce the
sentence, sua sponte. However, because a defendant has a constitutional right to be heard
throughout the probation revocation proceedings, State v. Rose, 144 Idaho at 766, including the
disposition hearing, Hurst cannot be extended to apply restrict that right at a disposition hearing.
For this reason also, the decision in Hurst should not be applied in this case.
5.

To The Extent Hurst May Be Applicable In This Case, Its Construction Of Rule
35’s Successive Motion Clause Is Incorrect, And Should Be Clarified Or Else
Overruled

Mr. Livingston submits that, in the event this Court does not distinguish Hurst from the
circumstances in this case, the construction and application of Rule 35 given by Hurst is
incorrect and should be clarified, or else overruled.

10

a.

Rule 35’s One-Motion Limitation

The full text of I.C.R. 35(b) states:
(b) Sentences imposed in an illegal manner or reduction of sentence. The court
may correct a sentence that has been imposed in an illegal manner within the time
provided herein for the reduction of sentence. The court may reduce a sentence
within 120 days after the filing of a judgment of conviction or within 120 days
after the court releases retained jurisdiction. The court may also reduce a sentence
upon revocation of probation or upon motion made within fourteen (14) days after
the filing of the order revoking probation. Motions to correct or modify sentences
under this rule must be filed within 120 days of the entry of the judgment
imposing sentence or order releasing retained jurisdiction and shall be considered
and determined by the court without the admission of additional testimony and
without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion;
provided, however that no defendant may file more than one motion seeking a
reduction of sentence under this Rule.
I.C.R. 35(b) (emphasis added).
The threshold question in this case turns on the construction and application of the Rule’s
last sentence, containing an explicit limitation “that no defendant may file more than one motion
seeking a reduction of sentence under this Rule.”
b.

The Rule 35’s Limitation On Successive Motions Does Not Apply To
Oral Requests: “File” Means “File”

In construing Rule 35(b)’s limitation, that no defendant “may file” more than one motion,
the Court in Hurst failed to give the term “file” its plain meaning. Instead, noting that elsewhere
the Rule had used the terms “filed” and “made” were used “interchangeably” in the Rule, the
Court decided that the Rule’s limitation on filing successive motions could be applied to written
motions and oral motions alike, without need for distinction. Hurst, 151 Idaho at 438.
However, by failing to give the plain meaning to the narrower term “file” in the limitation
provision, Hurst overlooked the difficulty its interpretation creates for courts in determining
whether jurisdiction exists: a previously-filed motion deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to
hear any subsequent motion. See State v. Bottens, 137 Idaho at 730. Therefore, a construction
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that gives the term “file” its plain meaning – namely, a writing – serves an important function of
enabling a trial court to clearly, and readily, discern its jurisdiction to hear a defendant’s Rule 35
motion for reduction. A defendant’s filed motion for reduction of sentence will be ascertainable
from the district court’s written record. Whereas, a defendant’s oral requests made at hearings
will not always be apparent from the record.
Because of the serious ramifications and consequences which could follow from a court
acting without jurisdiction, see State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 374 (Ct. App. 2008), it is vital
that a district court (and the appellate court thereafter) be capable of readily discerning, from the
record, whether the Rule 35 motion that it is asked to consider is the defendant’s first filed
motion seeking reduction of sentence. According to the holding in Hurst, however, an oral
request made at a previous hearing would deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to entertain a
subsequent motion, yet the court might not have any readily available means of detecting
whether that was the case. For example, a minute entry showing that a defendant previously
came before a trial court for jurisdictional review, or probation revocation, would not
necessarily, or adequately, inform the subsequent court whether the defense counsel had
requested a sentence reduction, particularly if that request went unheeded.
Likewise, a court order reducing the defendant’s sentence, absent a motion, would not
necessarily reveal whether the sentencing court had acted sua sponte, or had considered a request
from counsel.
However, a construction of the term “file” that gives this term its plain meaning will
enable trial courts to make critical determinations regarding their jurisdiction, because a written
motion that is “filed” will be contained in the record of the district court. Hurst’s construction of
the term, on the other hand, leaves the question of the trial court’s jurisdiction hinging on the

12

possibility of a previously-made oral request, the existence of which may not be ascertainable
from the district court record. For this reason, Mr. Livingston respectfully submits that Rule 35’s
limitation on filing successive motions should be construed to mean and apply to written motions
filed with the court.
c.

Hurst’s Reliance On State V. Wersland Is Misplaced

Finally, Mr. Livingston notes that, to the extent Hurst purports to rely on the Supreme
Court’s decision State v. Wersland to support the conclusion a defendant’s oral motion precludes
a subsequent filed motion, such reliance was misplaced. In Hurst, the court described Wersland
as having held that “the defendant was precluded from filing a written motion for reduction of
sentence after he had earlier made an oral request for the same relief.” 151 Idaho at 438 (quoting
Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 501, 504-05 (1994)). However, a review of the opinion in Wersland
makes clear that the first motion and the second motion were both “filed” motions. Wersland,
125 Idaho at 504. Hurst’s conclusion, then, that an oral motion for reduction of sentence
precludes a subsequent written motion, is not supported by this Supreme Court decision.
d.

Conclusion

In view of the Court of Appeals’ concerns expressed in Clontz, and given the difficulty,
created by Hurst, for trial courts to ascertain their jurisdiction to the entertain a given Rule 35
motion for reduction, Mr. Livingston respectfully submits that the decision in Hurst be revisited
and clarified, or else overruled.

13

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Livingston’s Rule 35 Motions For
Modification And Reduction Of His Sentences

A.

Introduction
Mr. Livingston contends that his sentences should have been reduced in light of the

additional information he presented at the hearing on this Rule 35 motions. He asserts that the
district court’s denial of his motions for sentence reduction, specifically, his request that the
fixed terms be made concurrent, rather than consecutive, represents an abuse of discretion.
B.

Standards Of Review
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound

discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if
the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.

State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253

(Ct. App. 1994). “The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same
as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.” Id. “If the
sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive
in view of new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction. Id.
Where a defendant challenges his sentence as excessively harsh, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the
character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho
828, 834 (2011). The Court reviews the district court’s sentencing decisions for an abuse of
discretion, which occurs if the district court imposed a sentence that is unreasonable, and thus
excessive, “under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002);
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). “A sentence is reasonable if it appears
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necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” Miller, 151 Idaho at 834.

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Declining To Reduce Mr. Livingston’s
Sentences, In Light Of The Additional Evidence Of His Rehabilitation And Commitment
To Recovery
The district court should have reduced Mr. Livingston’s sentences in light of the

information introduced at his Rule 35 hearing. According to the witnesses, Mr. Livingston had
done remarkably well on his most recent probation, living clean and sober for the first time in
well over a decade. By virtually all accounts, he became a changed man once he began drug
court. (Tr. Vol. 1, p.25, Ls.5-17; PSI, pp.55-66.) Mr. Livingston’s long history with drug
addiction, and his progress in overcoming that addiction, are strong mitigating factors in his case.
See State v. Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 171 (Ct. App. 2008).
Mr. Livingston worked hard to complete the attendance and homework requirements of
his substance abuse and behavioral programing, (PSI, pp.55-66), and he obtained and held
employment as a commercial driver. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.23, Ls.7-11.) He also had to work to
overcome his learning disability, as moving ahead in his program was difficult for him, and took
extra time. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.21, Ls.17-18.) He was committed to the program, however, and
enlisted the assistance of his niece to help him study for and pass the learning-skills tests.
(Tr. Vol. 2, p.8, Ls.4-24, p.18, Ls.7-10.)
He went to the Magic Valley Fellowship Hall on a daily basis, where he attended 12-step
program meetings, worked on homework from his treatment groups, and performed community
service. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.8, L.11 – p.10, L.17.) In fact, he had completed much of the required
programming before he was dismissed from drug court, (Tr. Vol.2, p.21, Ls.17-23), and even
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after he was dismissed, Mr. Livingston maintained his sobriety, kept his job, and continued to
attend his group meetings. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.9, Ls.2-12; PSI, p.57.)
Mr. Livingston’s transformation was felt most by his family members.

Prior to

participating in drug court, Mr. Livingston had been estranged from his mother and four grown
children. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.15, Ls.17–21.) For years, he had acted irrationally, was difficult to talk
to or get along with, and seemed dangerous – behaviors his family attributed to his abuse of
drugs. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.15, L.17 – p.16, L.15.) He had also attempted suicide numerous times.
(Tr. Vol. 2, p.15, Ls.12-20.) As his mother testified, once given the opportunity for drug court,
Mr. Livingston was finally able to stop using drugs and move ahead with his life. (Tr. Vol. 2,
p.23, Ls.7-11.) He had become a changed person. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.17, Ls.1-2.) In a letter to the
court his daughter wrote:
I never thought I would get my dad back or my kids would get there papa back at
the rate he was going he was on his death bed … The last few months in treatment
have literally changed him … he has been in my kids’ lives, he has been the father
I always needed and wanted … my DAD IS CLEAN AND SOBER, something
we have all been waiting for, something I never thought I would see again. He
has come so far. I am so proud of him.
(PSI, pp.63-64.)
His daughter-in-law wrote a similar observation:
Each day that has passed we are literally seeing a new person, a better person than
we’ve ever known him to be. His whole attitude and outlook is different. I have
never seen him work so hard to get his life back and make amends. … His mom,
his children and grandchildren need him. We finally got him back and better than
we have ever known him to be.
(PSI, pp.65-66.)
Finally, as Mr. Livingston told the court at his hearing,
I promised you that I was through with drugs, and I kept my promise. … I [now]
have a relationship with my children that I’ve never had before in my life… [due
to the] opportunity in the drug court.
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(Tr. Vol. 2, p.21, Ls.1-9.)
Given the evidence of Mr. Livingston’s remarkable progress on probation, and the strong
support shown by his family members, his combined sentences of seven years, with four years
fixed, is excessive, and the district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35
motions.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Livingston respectfully requests this Court to find it has authority to hear this appeal
and to revisit and clarify the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Hurst, or else overrule it.
Mr. Livingston further requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his Rule 35 motions be vacated
and the cases remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 26th day of May, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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